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Secrets in Plain View:
Covert Action the u.S. Way

M.E.Bowman

~~ TEAMERICANS HAYEA UNIQUE CULTURE. We champion openness

WW

~ government but implement many policies in secret. Historically, we
have been quick to fight for national honor but equally quick to publicly and
mercilessly criticize ourselves; a future historian might even conclude that we
defined our culture by airing dirty laundry. From the very beginning, we publicly
debated our national morality-from slavery to the Indian campaigns; from
Mexico to the Maine; from Vietnam to Panama. We even exposed "secret"
executive actions by televising the introspective and painful investigations of such
notable events as Iran,Contra and the Church Committee hearings. Probably
more than any other nation in the world, we can expect that sooner or later
virtually any executive activity of the United States will be publicly scrutinized.
Executive Action
Lacking precise definition, executive action has become a term of art that
describes activities designed to influence behavior. Executive action often is
"secret," but not always. If secret, it often is coercive. When practiced by the
United States, it is always a tool of foreign, never domestic, policy.

The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.

Covert Action the U.S. Way
Executive action may be applied directly-by military or paramilitary force,
economic leverage, or political activities-or it may consist of mere persuasion.
Executive action may also be applied indirectly, for example by using
surrogates, propaganda, or even covert military, economic, and political
activities. Each of these techniques will be a focus, from time to time, for covert
action. l
Covert action practiced by the United States shares its cultural heritage
with intelligence. A scant few decades ago, nations would tacitly concede, but
rarely admit, the common practice of international intelligence gathering--of
spying on other nations. The United States was no exception.
Prior to World War II, the United States was, perhaps, the least experienced
spy master of the developed nations. 2 U.S. intelligence activities had been a
desultory lot, sometimes favored, sometimes vilified, rarely admitted and
always in jeopardy of extinction. Yet, at the end of World War II, we not only
planned to continue into peacetime the intelligence institutions conceived in
war, we also codified and published the intent. More recently, we undertook a
similar catharsis with covert action.

American Candor
The National Security Act of 1947 was a mold for much of contemporary
U.S. Government intelligence practice. A legislative behemoth originally
devoted to overhauling the military establishment, the draft Act was seized
upon as a handy tool by which to create the National Security Council, a
Director of Central Intelligence, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Each is
an institution important enough, and certainly visible enough, to obscure what
may be the most Significant aspect of the Act. By this peacetime legislation, the
United States officially and publicly recognized intelligence gathering as a
legitimate foreign policy process.3
The Act was eloquent testimony to the belated acceptance by the United
States of international intelligence gathering that included even reading other
people's mai1. 4 Perhaps even more significant, however, was the world
reaction-or lack thereof. Global ennui eloquently testified to international
acceptance of intelligence activities. 5
The 1947 Act did more, however. Just as the Act acknowledged a purpose
to gather intelligence internationally, it also acknowledged-albeit
obliquely-an acceptance of the necessity to engage in covert action. In
understatement worthy of our British heritage, the Act required that the
2
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. Central Intelligence Agency perform such other functions as the National
Security Council might direct. 6
The meaning of that language in the 1947 Act might have been less than
obvious at its creation, but four decades later it was clarified. By that point in
history, it was probably unnecessary to clarify the fact that the U.S. engages in
international covert action, but the clarification was, nevertheless, instructive.
In 1991, in an era when the sovereignty of developing nations was at its
emotional apex, the Congress of the United States once again did something
that only a secure democracy could dare. Not unlike its 1947 legislative
admission, Congress publicly confirmed its policy of peacetime covert action by
amending the U.S. Code to more explicitly acknowledge covert action as U.S.
policy.7
Congress statutorily confirmed an acceptance of covert influence on the
affairs of other nations. This easily was our most profound statement on U.S.
willingness to mold other nations to our liking. It was also unusual candor in an
era when proliferation of new nation,States elevated sovereign emotions to
new heights.s Nevertheless, as with the 1947 legislation, not a ripple disturbed
the surface of the nation,state system.

U.S. Covert Action
Because covert action amounts to interference with sovereign rights,
nations always seek to distance themselves from the activity.9 The reason is
axiomatic-covert actions inherently, and universally, are fractious political
issues that flaunt a universal need for rules of international behavior.
Nevertheless, from time to time, all nations find it necessary to cloak official
processes from public view; certainly, that was never more true than during the
era of the Cold War. 10 Adversaries and ideology aside, the Cold War interest in
avoiding nuclear conflict promoted a relatively high tolerance for covert action
as well as understood "rules" for the genre. "Plausible deniability" was a key
goal; indeed, in that bipolar world it became rule number one.l1
Our limited experience with modem covert action originates primarily in
World War nY Ours is a culture that easily tolerates covert actions as a
daring,do adjunct to armed combat, but to surreptitiously influence (or
change) other governments in peacetime is far more difficult for us to
countenance. Not unlike our history of intelligence gathering, covert action
has no luster in the United States-we simply don't like secrecy. We like to
consider ourselves as ingenuous, open, and honest. We prefer to regard
deviousness and secrecy as the product of evil empires. More importantly, we
3
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believe strongly in a government of shared political power. Covert action,
which definitionally restricts participatory activity, seems somehow
antithetical to these ideals.
Despite this cultural inhibition, covert action was "writ large" in the political
environment of the post,War period. The fall of Nazism and the rise of
communism ushered in an era of political tension, paranoia, economic
distress-and nuclear terror. Covert actions seemed to be ideally suited to
accomplish foreign policy goals without unacceptable risk of rekindling mnitary
conflict. Prodded by Cold War fears, the number of covert actions multiplied.
Communist insurgencies and communist,inspired political subversion had
become ubiquitous reality during the tedious process of rebuilding, or building
anew, from a war,ravaged world. Polarized political views, coupled with a
tenuous peace, made traditional foreign policy slow and cumbersome in a
fast,developing world. By contrast, covert action beckoned policy makers with
a promise of swift, high,impact alternatives ideally suited for post,war
containment policy. The result, observed Henry Kissinger, is that all Presidents
since World War II "have felt a need for covert operations in the gray area
between formal diplomacy and military intervention."l3
Shielding the United States as well as the President from public scrutiny, 14
even marginal success served to breed new covert actions. Knowledge of covert
operations became so commonplace that the United States was accused of
being responsible for nearly all internal difficulties worldwide. IS Not
surprisingly, the American political consensus of the war years that had
insulated intelligence and covert action from close scrutiny did not survive the
advent of peace.
Close scrutiny did not occur overnight, but when it started, it became an
irresistible force. Covert actions begun under the OSS continued through the
both formative and mature years of the CIA. Then, more plebeian domestic
concerns related to U.S. intelligence activities focused legislative attention on
covert activities as well. Our proclivity for participatory democracy prevailed;
all "secret" foreign policy came up for debate, and covert action was no
exception. Under the sharp scrutiny of Senator Frank Church, the intelligence
community suffered the slings and arrows of what many might justifiably
consider to have been righteous hindsight.
Post,war domestic abuses of intelligence resources are a matter of history.
Even so, most observers today will concede that many of the "abuses" are more
clearly perceived as such when seen through the eyes of the citizen of the 1970s
than through the eyes of citizens of the 1930s, 40s, or 50s, when the relevant
activities were initiated. The interim years had elevated personal privacy rights

4

M.E.Bowman
to pedestal heights and sharpened the analysis of Constitutional guarantees
against government intrusion. As each passing day made it less likely that
communism would absorb the United States, apocalyptic post,war fears
receded to focus on more personal concerns. Tolerance for "Big Brother"
decreased, and government increasingly was put on a tighter leash.
In this climate, the Church Committee began its well, known probe of
United States' intelligence activity. It inquired, inter alia, into the scope of U.S .
covert action, its value, its techniques, and its necessity.16 It questioned
whether covert action had become a substitute for decision, making, whether a
covert capability should be maintained, and, if so, whether it should remain in
the CIA.
The Committee pointedly concluded its analysis with the observation that
covert action was not included in the CIA charter (the National Security Act of
1947), but conceded that the Act had a savings clause to provide for
contingencies. Specifically, the Act empowered the CIA to "perform such
other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security
as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.,,17 Relying on
this clause, the National Security Council did issue a series of directives
specifying the CIA's covert mission. IS Then came the invasion of South Korea.
As with Germany, World War II's end left Korea divided into spheres of
influence. The Soviets controlled the North and the United States the South.
Unlike the European experience, however, both powers withdrew, leaving the
Koreans to settle their own quarrels. The result was a conflagration that
threatened bipolar stalemate. In this situation, covert operations seemed
especially desirable.
With modest beginnings in Korea, covert operations quickly supplied their
own justification. By 1953, moderate successes in Korea had prompted the
authorization of covert operations in forty,eight countries. 19 As covert
capability matured and expanded, it became necessary to create within the
CIA the Directorate for Plans (DDP) to absorb and make more efficient the
covert action capability.20 This was not merely a matter of efficiency.
Organizing the DDP reflected concern for the expansive interest shown by the
Soviet Union in the Third World and a felt need to combat that interest.
Covert actions of this era were extensive, varied, and expensive-and
wholly Executive in origin. All were undertaken pursuant to the inherent,
albeit nebulous, Constitutional authority of the President. There is room, of
course, for traditional legislative/executive debate over the Constitutional
authority to authorize covert action, but, at least in that period of our history, it
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is quite likely that Congress wanted no part of the covert operations tar baby.
Senator Leverett Saltonstall explained Congressional inactivity this way:
It is not a question of reluctance on the part of CIA officials to speak to us ...
it is a question of our reluctance ... to seek information ... on subjects which I
personally, as a member of Congress and as a citizen, would rather not have.... 21

Legislative Initiatives
Not until 1974 did Congress seriously begin to consider a role for itself in
covert operations. Up to that time, the only outlet for Congressional concerns
over covert action had been the traditional briefing process, but the expansive
growth of covert actions soon proved this to be inadequate. According to one
of the modem architects of covert action, Clark Clifford, the use of covert
action had become a primary official activity which simply had "gotten out of
hand."22 Congressional remediation, equally traditional, was legislation.
Frustrated generally by lack of knowledge,23 and specifically by massive
covert operations (and expenditures) in Peru, Congress amended the Foreign
Assistance Act to deny expenditures for covert operations unless, a
Presidential finding of importance to the national security preceded the
operation.24 The Hughes,Ryan Amendment also mandated a reporting
requirement and increased the number of committees to be informed of covert
actions. It was, to be sure, watershed legislation, but for many it was simply too
little too late. In the final analysis, the Amendment was ineffective because it
lacked teeth; nevertheless, Congress had thrown down a marker.
Soon thereafter, a long,smoldering conflict between Nicaragua and
Honduras erupted. Politically, the United States looked with disfavor on the
Nicaraguan regime and adopted a policy of supporting Honduras, or, more
accurately, of opposing Nicaragua. U.S. actions in support of Contra guerrillas
were both overt and covert, each prompting substantial criticism and venting
emotions not unlike those of the Vietnam era. One result was an amendment
to the 1983 Defense Appropriations Bill designed to end all aid to the
Contras.25 Originally a classified addition to the 1983 Intelligence
Authorization Act, the Boland Amendment restricted the use of appropriated
funds to overthrow the Sandinista government and limited CIA covert
operations to the interdiction of Nicaraguan arms supplies.
Of course, the Boland Amendment accomplished neither goal. Of little
more substantive effect than the Hughes,Ryan amendment, yet another spark
6
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was required to rekindle Congressional scrutiny and to prompt an oversight
role. Two were quickly forthcoming.
The first catalyst was a second legislative "fix," dubbed Boland II. This
legislation prohibited military or paramilitary support for the Contras by the
CIA, DoD, "or any other agency or entity involved in intelligence activities.,,26
The net result, according to Bud McFarlane, National Security Advisor, was to
transfer the responsibility to the National Security Council staff, because "The
President had made it clear that he wanted a job done."27 The "job,"
unfortunately, would include an ineptly conceived plan to interrupt commerce
by mining Nicaraguan harbors. It was a covert action that quickly lost its
covertness in implementation.
This "covert" action prompted an international outcry,zs as well as adverse
international legal opinion. 29 Worse, however, was the domestic controversy.
The Nicaraguan mining affair resulted in truly vitriolic debates over covert
action, with the predictable result of diminishing public acceptance for the
tactic.
Kindling even greater consternation, however, was the second spark-the
Iran,Contra affair. Executive Order 12,333 vested in the CIA exclusive
jurisdiction over "special activities," a euphemism for covert action, "unless the
President determines that another agency is more likely to achieve a particular
objective.,,3o At the time of drafting, it was generally assumed that the "other
agency" would be the Department of Defense, but the vagueness of the
language permitted the White House itself, through the NSC staff, to engage
directly in a covert action, with disastrous results. 31
.
After this disgrace, covert action acquired something of a pariah status. In
the wake of "Iran, Contra" and Nicaraguan mining, covert action translated as
"dirty tricks," somehow antithetical to the "American way." American
reluctance to countenance either government secrecy or official failure was
reinforced and the undesirable nature of covert action seemingly confirmed.32
The result of national anguish over these "failures," not necessarily wise, not
necessarily unwise, was new legislation that defined covert action. 33 It was not
definition that Congress sought, however, but rather a threefold means of
gaining limited procedural control and limited oversight of covert action. First,
it sought to gain more timely information from the President concerning
Executive intent to implement covert actions. Second, Congress intended to
limit the ability of the President to avoid accountability to Congress with
"plausible deniability.,,34 Finally, Congress decided to opt for a very a limited
measure of fiscal control over the broad Executive authority to authorize a
covert action.
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The implementation of these procedures includes oversight authority vested
in the intelligence committees. Importantly, the legislation prohibits
authorization of a covert action, or expenditure of appropriated funds for one,
unless the President first makes a written finding, specifying the action arm of
government, that the activity is necessary to support identifiable foreign policy
objectives, and that it is important to the national security.35 It further requires
that the intelligence committees be kept fully and currently informed. 36

Covert Action: The Congressional View
A commonly accepted, though noninclusive, list of covert actions and,
presumably, of "special activities" is propaganda,37 political action,38
paramilitary operations,39 coup d'etat, and intelligence support.40 Whatever it
might include, the legislation clearly rejects the definition of "special activities"
found in Executive Order 12333.41 The reason for the rejection, however, is
marginally helpful.
The drafters intended to exclude the over,broad concept of foreign policy
interests from their definition of "covert action." The vast reach of foreign
policy simply makes it necessary to negate that frame of reference. The clear
intent was to create an imprecise but manageable definition that would limit
reporting only to a class of activities that the drafters believed should be
brought to their attention.
Neither the statute nor the statutory history cogently defines the activities
included in the concept of events designed to influence political, economic, or
military conditions abroad. That, however, is inherently rational. An
excessively rigid statute easily could eliminate altogether any capability for
covert action by levying conditions that would make secrecy implausible or by
demanding too much prior definition of operations that require flexibility and
decision, making in the field.
Recognizing the "easier said than done" nature of their effort, Congress set
about to define by exclusion the scope of their interest in covert action. The
statute, and most of the legislative history, focus on what covert action is not.42
To oversimplify, excluded from Congressional oversight are the traditional
activities of the military, the intelligence community, diplomats and law
enforcement officers. Remaining to be included, therefore, are covert
paramilitary operations, propaganda, and covert political activities-and
whatever the "nontraditional" counterparts to the exempted activities might
be.
8
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The statutory history makes clear that "covert action" is intended to include
even nonattributable efforts in support of a noncovert activity. The sine qua
non of a covert action, however, is not secrecy, whether in whole or in part, but
rather plausible deniability. If plausible deniability is not viable, or if it is not to
be claimed, the activity undertaken simply is not a covert action. Therefore,
even "activities undertaken in secret but where the role of the United States
will be disclosed or acknowledged once such activities take place are not covert
actions."43

Covert Action in Practice
The practical problem, however, is more subtle than mere secrecy and
deniability. Chicken and egg issues are a natural concomitant of covert action.
Frequently it is impossible logically to differentiate between covert actions and
exempted activities. Payments for intelligence acquisition may strengthen the
coffers of dissident groups sufficiently to mount a successful revolution. Is the
purpose to gain intelligence or to influence events? The two have very different
legislative consequences. Support given to local intelllgence or police
organizations might have the effect of neutralizing hostile intelligence services,
but also of gaining valuable intelligence information. Which is the collateral
effect? Does the potential for an unintended consequence trigger reporting?44
Similarly quixotic is the distinction between forceful and non,forceful
intervention. No longer defined merely by territorial integrity, international
stability now rests on myriad complex and intangible features. In tum, this
means that covert action, with its undercurrent of manipulation, easily can tip
the fine balance of national and international perceptions and fears. A covert
operation to support paramilitary forces may have the effect of influencing
political programs; but just as likely, support for political programs may
promote esteem for dissident paramilitary organizations. The natural effect of
foreign policy, whether covert or overt, and regardless of the use of force, may
be lowering the threshold for what will be perceived as unacceptable
intervention.
Despite the risks, the United States' experience in this century seems to
confirm a national self,interest in maintaining a covert action capability. It is as
true today as ever in history that a covert action adjunct of foreign policy
remains necessary. It is also true, however, that covert operations come with an
ever,increasing cost. Inaptly applied, covert action can be a damaging
instrument. Unfortunately, covert action and plausible deniability can be
seductive.
9
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Secrecy gives the covert enterprise a poignant emphasis. Absent the glare of
sunlight and the public impact of overt force, covert action easily can become a
beguiling adventure. History indicates that policy makers sometimes find it an
irresistible temptation to opt for covert action in lieu, rather than in support, of
foreign policy.45 Used as a knee,jerk substitute for policy, it is rarely effective;
more importantly, the failure of a covert option puts the option at risk for the
future. Used properly, covert actions may serve national and even
international needs.

The Balance
Therein lies the legislative purpose. Although the precise authority for
covert action is debatable, it is clear that both the Congress and the Executive
believe it a necessary option. Both presume that legal authority exists to engage
in covert action and each presumes to have a Constitutionally authorized, if
not precisely defined, role.
The legal authorities for covert action were discussed in the Church
Committee's Final Report, without closure, and continue to be debated today.
In asserting its current role, Congress legislatively created procedural
requirements precedent to the Executive authOrizing covert action. The
laudable intent was to ensure coherent policy, but it is a goal that requires
surgical skill. The reasons for this are threefold.
1) Secrecy: Although covert action is generally acknowledged to be a
valuable tool of statecraft, it is a limited tool, wholly dependent on an
acceptable measure of secrecy. A failure of secrecy risks the foreign policy to
which the covert action is dedicated, exposes national warts, and, in the
extreme, may leave only the distressing options of withdrawal or overt military
intervention. Painful experience demonstrates that secrecy is as perishable as it
is necessary. The concomitant of secrecy likewise is threefold.
a) Need to know: To maintain secrecy, it follows that operational
knowledge must be narrowly restricted. Removing knowledge from the
effective controls of the Executive, and committing it to the less constrained
legislature, puts the enterprise and those involved at additional risk. That does
not mean the risk is unreasonable, merely that it exists.46
b) Reasonable scope: Perhaps more important is the barnyard bromide
that one shouldn't bite off more than one can chew. Covert actions must be of a
sufficiently limited scope and duration that they can be accomplished within
the parameters of secrecy. History demonstrates that overly ambitious
undertakings are likely to lose their mantle of secrecy.
10
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c) Practical benefit: There is a practical side to secrecy as well. Normally,
secrecy will be required to ensure the safety of persons involved. Not
infrequently, secrecy is required to preserve the covert option for a repetitive,
future use. Sometimes it is even useful to take advantage of an opportunity to
cast another in the role of unscrupulous actor. 47
2) Plausible deniability: Unlike clandestine operations, which are intended not
to be known at all, covert operations generally are known, but the national actors
remain invisible. The reason for this essential feature harkens to concepts of both
sovereignty and diplomacy. The nation~state system that grew out of the Peace
of Westphalia (1648) hinges on sovereign inviolability, for lack of which
international instability historically has been the result. However, nations do
interfere with the internal affairs of other nations; therefore, a means of
preserving stability despite interference with sovereign rights is required.
To lessen the risk of war or political polarization of states, the ability of the
actor to disclaim responsibility, and of the affected nation to disclaim knowledge,
is a necessary charade. Without plausible deniability, nations would be forced
into humiliating political retreat and to curtail, or even sever, diplomatic ties in
the face of a sovereign affront. At the extremes, even war can result.
3) Political Judgment: Finally, the most subjective and least manageable
problem associated with shared Constitutional powers is the exercise of shared
political judgment.48 The real question is not whether both the executive and
the legislative branches of government have a role in foreign policy; rather, it is
how each may fulfill its perceived role without bringing to fruition the very real
problem of interfering with the other.
Legislation is inherently inflexible and slow to be displaced, even when
national needs change. Executive decision~making capability can be prompted,
for good or bad, by the exigencies of the moment. Cutting Solomon's baby in
half, we should expect that legislation affecting covert action, properly
considered, would (1) slow impulse, but not impede decision~making, with
procedural rather than substantive requirements; (2) promote executive
decision~making that takes into account popular will, and, (3) permit the
Executive to remain sufficiently flexible to meet changing or novel
circumstances. Objectively, the Congressional attempt to control covert
action seems to meet these goals.

A Potent Option
By any standard, covert action is less offensive than overt intervention, but
it remains politically risky.49 Such are the sensitivities of nations that today
11
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even economic or political coercion may be viewed with the same jaundiced
eye as the world once viewed physical intervention.5o This will certainly be the
case as the tensions of the Cold War continue to dissipate. With the world less
concerned about global conflict, intrusive behavior that once might have been
tolerated as anemic warfare, or justified as a measure of extra,legal justice, will
become less acceptable. Nevertheless, just as overt but coercive diplomatic and
economic activities will be tolerated, even if condemned, so will covert actions.
There are limits, however, beyond which the American public will not
countenance covert action and both the executive and legislative branches of
government must know and respect those limits. The bottom line is that the
President cannot, without repercussion, engage in a covert action that the
people would not approve were they to know of the facts and circumstances. The
Congress, without covert action capabilities itself, has chosen to serve as the
people's overseer.
With what is hopefully the wisdom of Solomon, both the executive and
legislative branches publicly acknowledge a willingness to engage in covert
action. The world knows, ifit cares to know, that the U.S. is willing to interfere
in the internal affairs of other sovereigns. It knows also that Congressional
involvement negates the probability, if not the possibility, of a rogue executive.
Finally, the world also must presume that the American citizenry would, if it
could be fully informed, approve the covert actions undertaken.
What makes the United States unique is that we dislike the fundamentals of
our own policy. We take national pride in promoting self,determination, public
disclosure, and public diplomacy. We dislike secrecy. We dislike covert action.
Still, despite our moralistic foundation, we sidestep Westphalian
sovereignty and acknowledge a commitment to secret foreign policy. Even we
find it anomalous that we will interfere with the internal affairs of other
nations. But ours is, after all, a unique culture.
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24. 22 Pub. L. 93-559, 50 U.S.C. §2422 (1974). President Gerald Ford personally opposed
the personal certification requirement in his recommendations on the legislation. See FINAL
REpORT, supra note 1 at 58, n. 26.
25. Pub. L. No. 97-377, §793, 46 Stat. 1865 (1982).
26. Pub. L. No. 98-473, §8066, 98 Stat. 1935 (1984). See also Pub. L. No. 99-591
(Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1987) §9037, 100 Stat. 3341-108; §9045, 100
Stat. 3341-109 (1986).
27. REpORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-CONTRA
AFFAIR WITH THE MINORITY VIEW 48-52 (Brinkley and Engelberg eds., 1988). The National
Security Council was, and is, a policy-advising body, not an "agency or entity involved in
intelligence activities."
28. Compare Christopher C. Joyner & Michael A. Grimaldi, The United States and Nicaragua:
Reflections on the Lawfulness of Contemporary Intervention, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 621 (1985), with John
N. Moore, The Secret War in Central American and the Future of World Order, 80 AM. J. INT'L L.
43 (1986).
29. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. V. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4.
30. Exec. Order No. 12,333, supra note 4, § 1.8(e).
31. See HOUSE SELECT COMM. TO INVESTIGATE COVERT ARMs TRANSACTIONS WITH
IRAN AND SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE
NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION, REpORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES INVESTIGATING
THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, S. REp. NO. 216, H.R. REp. NO. 433, at3-11 (1987).
32. E.g., a covert operation in support of Afghanistan guerilla resistance to the 1979 Soviet
invasion remains a source of criticism. In 1997 the United States was still trying to recover
Stinger anti-aircraft missiles originally destined to oppose Soviet aircraft but today potentially in
the hands of terrorists.
33. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(3); see note 43 infra.
34. See, e.g., MARK RIEBLING, WEDGE: THE SECRETWAR BETWEEN THE FBI AND CIA 151
(1994).
35. 50US.C. §413b(a).
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36. Id., §413b(b).
37. The dissemination of nonattributable information or communications designed to affect
the conditions under which governments act. The substance may be either true or false, or some
combination of each.
38. This might consist of advice, money, or physical assistance, with a purpose to encourage
desired activities or dissuade those considered hostile.
39. Secret military assistance, usually in the form of training.
40. E.g., security assistance and intelligence training for the leadership of the "right" faction.
41. Two respected authorities argue that the statute was intended to supersede the
definition found in Exec. Order No. 12,333. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN and JAMES BAKER,
REGULATING COVERT ACTION 123 (1992). The author respectfully disagrees with the breadth
of that statement. Legislative history indicates that the intent was to regulate by procedure only a
limited portion of the Order's concept of activities, not to displace legislatively its broad foreign
policy scope. Reisman and Baker criticize the legislative definition as under-inclusive and write
more approvingly of the definition in the Hughes-Ryan Amendment. Virtually any definition
wUI be subject to criticism as being either under or over-inclusive, but under-inclusion is
consistent with the limited scope of oversight that Congress then thought appropriate.
42. Covert action means an activity or activities of the United States Government to
influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of
the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not
include:
(1) activities the primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence, traditional
counterintelligence activities, traditional activities to improve or maintain the operational
security of United States Government programs, or administrative activities;
(2) traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine support to such activities;
(3) traditional law enforcement activities conducted by United States Government law
enforcement agencies or routine support to such activities; or
(4) activities to provide routine support to the overt activities (other than activities
described in paragraphs (1), (2) or (3) of other United States Government agencies abroad.
50 U.S.C § 413b(3).
43. S. REp. No. 85, at 42 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 193, 236. Some view this
language to indicate that Congress meant to treat all Executive actions intended to remain
secret as covert action. This writer believes that view is grossly over-inclusive. Like the issue of
unintended consequences, this is a subject deserving of a stand-alone analysis.
44. An even more difficult question is whether any Executive action that is intended to
remain secret invokes the statute. Despite the statutory language and its legislative history, this is
an issue over which reasonable minds can differ and is, more properly, an issue for separate
analysis.
45. PRADOS, supra note 10, is a thoughtful study of paramilitary covert actions that, in large
measure, reflects this concern.
46. The Hughes-Ryan Amendment, for example, required the CIA to report all covert
actions to eight congressional committees, four in each house. While it is difficult to argue
against the propriety of Congress being in the "know," in practical terms this meant sixty
members, plus staff, all newly exposed to facts, the mere intimation of which can cause a failure
in foreign policy and, perhaps, the death of the actors.
47. One historian, writing of General Washington's military espionage apparatus,
concluded: "It was deemed good propaganda to impute clandestine methods only to the enemy,
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thus implying that Britain was unscrupulous and had to use underhanded tactics to succeed."
RHODRI JEFFREYS-JONES, AMERICAN EsPIONAGE: FROM SECRET SERVICE TO CIA 9 (1977).
48. In Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170 (1805), the Supreme Court limited the foreign policy
powers of the President because the Congress had chosen to speak. During a period of hostilities
with France, and acting on Presidential orders, the U.S. Navy seized a ship departing a French
port. Congress, however, had enacted legislation to halt the intercourse with France which
authorized seizure of ships sailing to a French port. Speaking for the Court, Chief justice
Marshall opined that the President's orders would undoubtedly have been lawful had not
Congress legislated differently.
49. To illustrate, two covert actions usually cited as successes were Operations "Ajax" in
Iran (placing the Shah in power) and "Success" in Guatemala (displacement of President
Arbenz). Both were short-term gains, and neither materially affected the balance of power in the
Cold War; yet a failure in either might well have forced those nations into the Soviet camp. The
truth is that national interest suffers if a covert action fails, particularly so ifit is the more visible
paramilitary action. While it is impossible to know the real history of all covert actions, covert
paramilitary actions do not have a gleaming record of success.
50. See e.g., Mitrovic, Non-Intervention in the Internal Affairs of States, in PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION 219 (Milan
Sahovic ed., 1972).
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